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According to the classical understanding of how patents work, a 
product and, if it does, either commences negotiations to establish 
royalty payments or files patent litigation to claim the appropriate 
damages, royalties, or injunction. 1   Similarly, as a new product is 
developed, the company examines the universe of relevant granted 
patents to make certain that no infringement will be triggered by the 
new product.2  If a covering patent is found, the company at least if it 
will attempt to negotiate a license to use the patented 
technology and, if that fails, either design the new product around the 
patent so that infringement will be avoided3 or abandon the product 
development effort.4
The idealized model described above does not match the reality of 
the modern patent system, as a focused examination of a product in 
comparison to the relevant universe of patents is much less likely to 
occur now than in the past.5   This article examines this disconnect 
between the reality of how patents are being used today and the 
underlying principal of patent law that a monopoly is granted in 
                                                                                                                                        
1 See Tom Harris, How Patents Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://money.howstuffworks.com/patent.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); Jim 
Anderson, Why IT Managers Need to Know About How Patents Work, THE 
ACCIDENTAL IT LEADER (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://theaccidentalitleader.com/innovation-2/why-it-managers-need-to-know-about-
how-patents-work.; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., Frequently Asked 
Questions: Patents, http://www.wipo.int/patents/en/faq_patents.html (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2016); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies 
and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 61 69 (2005) 
(describing how patent claims serve to inform others about the scope of the invention 
made). To clarify the discussion, this article will describe the problems being 
addressed using the language of product patents. The issues being discussed are 
equally apropos to process patents, however, so the discussion of product patents is 
not meant to exclude process patents. 
2 See DAVID A. BURGE, PATENT & TRADEMARK TACTICS & PRACTICE 102 05
(3d ed. 1999). But see Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 637 (2010) (criticizing many current patents for failing to 
clearly describe the invention made). 
3 See, e.g.,State Indus. Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235 36 (Fed. 
of the patent system). 
4 Julie Bennett, From Idea to Market, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 20, 2010), 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/217332 (advising those who find an existing 
for a product that already exists). 
5 See infra Part II. 





exchange for the disclosure of new technologies.6  Specifically, it will 
address two problems that plague the current patent system:7 the use of 
overwhelming abundance of newly issued patents.8
A possible solution to these problems is proposed in the form of a 
compulsory licensing system for most patents.  This solution is 
described as a method of identifying the types of changes that would be 
needed to overcome the problems and not with an expectation that it 
could be adopted easily 9  or that it would not raise issues within 
international norms.10
II. THE CURRENT PATENT SYSTEM AS A MARKET FAILURE FOR A 
MAJORITY OF ISSUED PATENTS
A.
Recently, a practicing patent attorney11 used an interesting analogy 
f
                                                                                                                                        
6 See Ralph D. Clifford, Thomas G. Field, Jr. & Jon R. Cavicchi, A Statistical 
Analysis of the Patent Bar: Where Are the Software-Savvy Patent Attorneys?, 11
N.C. J. LAW & TECH. 223, 224 26 (2010). 
7 Id. at 224 26 nn.4 7.
8 Id.
9 It is highly unlikely that the current Congress would be receptive to the 
proposal as the countervailing policies that need to be balanced in a patent provision 
appear to freeze Congress in place. Cf. Tom Risen, Congress, Silicon Valley Spar on 
Tackling Patent Trolls, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 14, 2015 6:49 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/14/congress-silcon-valley-spar-on-
how-to-tackle-patent-trolls. 
10 It is not clear that compulsory licenses would comply with the obligation 
under existing treaty obligations to make patent rights enforceable. See Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art. 28(1)(a), Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm 
consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing (6) 
stion whether the compulsory 
 In any case, the 
legally binding nature of the treaty is far from clear. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (2012) 
the application of any 
such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the 
. See also David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round 
Introduction to International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 9 (1995). 
11 The attorney works as in-house patent counsel for a large computer firm. As 
preserved. 





or litigating against a competing firm.  He constantly referred to his 
became clear that analogy was quite apt, but was not the one that 
12  On first impression, one could 
assume that his work for his company involved finding the patent needle 
within the haystack 
clear, however, that this is not what he meant. 
Much of the licensing work that he was doing had nothing to do with 
an identified technological product that read on to an identified patent;13
instead, with the 
portfolio, the odds were high that at least some of them would be 
relevant.  In other words, both companies now assume that the needle 
patent one that actually does read onto the technology is in the 
portfolio somewhere but, like the needle in the haystack, no one has the 
time or interest to actually read the patents and find the relevant sharp. 
Thus, he stated, it is not important to have an identified patent that 
ther, it is important to have a 
haystack of patents that is so large that no competitor would ever have 
the time to sort through the haystack to find out if the needle is actually 
there.14  The threat of using the haystack was enough, as a practical 
matter, to force the surrender of the competitor because its size would 
present an overwhelming burden of comprehension (and expense, if 
litigation occurs).15  Under the haystack theory, a thousand patents
even if all of them are likely to be found invalid if challenged in court
is better than one good one.16  No one, after all, can afford to challenge 
a thousand patents,17 but may easily be able to fund the challenge of 
                                                                                                                                        
12 See ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF CLICHÉS 151 (Dutton Paperback ed., 
1963). 
13
patent to an allegedly infringing device as, in most cases, if there is an identity 
between the claims and the device, infringement has occurred. See, e.g., Rice v. 
Schutte, 38 App. D.C. 175, 177 78 (D.C. Cir. 1912). 
14 See Justin R. Orr, Note, Patent Aggregation: Models, Harms, and the Limited 
Role of Antitrust, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 525, 526 (2013) (discussing aggregating 
weak patents into portfolios as a market tactic). As a practical matter, there are likely
to be relevant patents to any product if a company owns thousands of patents within 
the same art. Cf. id.
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Malcom Gladwell, ,
WASH. POST, May 29, 1991, available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/05/29/nih-may-seek-to-void-
firms-patent-on-azt/3270d0fa-55d7-4995-af2b-293db96a4fff/. 
17 According to a survey conducted by the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association in 2013, the cost to defend a patent suit runs from an average of 






Of course, the patent law definitional model established in the 
United States is built on the use of needles, not haystacks.18  Although 
some modifications to the litigation system may encourage a partial 
return to a needle over a haystack design parameter within the patent 
system, 19  more systematic change appears necessary to make this 
universal. 
B. More Than a Quarter of a Million New Patents a Year 
The patent system is dependent on its users understanding the entire 
portfolio of patented technology within the relevant area as well as 
absorbing advancing technology once it is disclosed in newly granted 
patents.20  Any company that is developing a new product is expected, 
after all, to design it in a way that does not infringe existing or newly 
issued patents.21  A failure to meet this requirement results in liability 
for infringement.22  Consequently, to protect a company against suit, its 
patent attorneys must appreciate the entire set of existing patents and 
must keep abreast of newly issued ones.23  The reality today, however, 
is that both of these tasks are practical impossibilities.24
Currently, there are an estimated 3 million active utility patents,25
                                                                                                                                        
$516,000 if the claim is less than $1,000,000 and the action ends at the discovery 
phase to a mean of $2,671,000 if the claim is more than $10,000,000 and the action 
requires a full litigation on the merits. AILPA, Rpt. of the Econ. Survey 2013 at I-
145 46; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae Computer & Communications Industry 
, WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. 
Ct. 2870 (2014) (No. 13-255), 2013 WL 5372423, at *11.
18 See, e.g., John Raidt, Patents and Biotechnology, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMM.
FOUND., https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/patents-and-biotechnology (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2016) (discussing one of the challenges to patenting in the 
biotechnology industry is excessive litigation).  
19 See Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform: Innovation Act of 2015, PATENTLYO 
(Feb. 15, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/02/patent-reform-innovation.html 
(describing litigation reforms in the submitted bill). 
20 DAVID A. BURGE, PATENT & TRADEMARK TACTICS & PRACTICE 103 (3d ed. 
you should s
21 See generally Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent 
Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643 (2010) (discussing the preemptive effect of the current
patent system and proposing an alternative). 
22 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). Only a limited defense is available to commercial 
use of a patent that starts more than a year before the patent application is filed or
disclosed. Id. § 273. 
23 See BURGE, supra note 20, at 103. 
24 See infra notes 25 31 and accompanying text. 
25 See Dennis Crouch, Patent Number Nine Million, PATENTLYO (Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/04/patent-number-million.html (noting that 





many of which could read onto a new product.  This number is not static 
as record numbers of new patents are being issued each year.26  In 2013, 
nearly 278,000 new utility patents were issued.27  In 2014, the number 
of newly issued utility patents increased to over 300,000.28  To process 
just these new 300,000 patents, you would need to read and understand 
144 of them per business hour for eight hours per day on every business 
day which is the equivalent of reading and understanding a new patent 
every twenty-five seconds.29  Even if a hypothetical patent attorney 
could work twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, more than 
thirty-four patents an hour would need to be evaluated.30  Under the best 
of circumstances, it takes more than twenty-five seconds (or even two 
minutes) to read and understand a patent. 
Even if it is assumed that the relevant newly issued patents can be 
found, read, and understood at this rate, failure is still probable.  No time 
is left to review the 3 million patents that have already been issued.  
Understanding the technology disclosed in existing and newly issued 
patents thus appears to be a Sisyphean burden.31
                                                                                                                                        
approximately one-third of the nine million issued utility patents are currently 
active). 
26 Dennis Crouch, USPTO Grants and Applications Both Down (Slightly) for 
FY2015, PATENTLYO (May 26, 2015), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/05/applications-slightly-fy2015.html [hereinafter 
Crouch, USPTO Grants]. Some are predicting that 2014 is a peak year in the number 
of patents issued. Id. Even if the predicted drop in issued utility patents occurs, it is 
expected to be by only 2%, approximately 2,000 fewer patents from a base of over 
300,000. Id.
27 U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2014, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm 
(last modified Mar. 9, 2016). 
28 Id.  
29 This calculation uses the federal definition of a business hour, which 
determines that there are 2,087 hours in the average work year. See U.S. OFF. OF 
PERSONNEL MGMT., Fact Sheet: Computing Hourly Rates of Pay Using The 2,087-
Hour Divisor, http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/pay-
administration/fact-sheets/computing-hourly-rates-of-pay-using-the-2087-hour-
divisor/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). The number of hours is based on a forty-hour 
work week, and does not include vacation or sick time. Id. Additionally, the formula 
determines that there are almost 261 business days in the average year. See id.
Dividing the 300,000 patents by 2,087 gives just under 144 per hour. Looking at 
the inverse, this would give someone approximately twenty-five seconds to read and 
understand each patent. Since the federal figure excludes things like vacation time,
the task would actually be more difficult than this calculation shows. 
30 There are 8,760 clock-hours in a non-leap year (365 days times twenty-four 
hours). 
31 Sisyphus, a Greek mythological character, was ordered by Hades to
repeatedly roll a heavy boulder up a hill, only to see it roll back down as soon as he 
reached the summit sk is one that is exhausting, 





Some relief could be had by hiring more patent attorneys to do the 
work; after all, if one attorney would have to process 144 patents in an 
hour, two would cut than number in half to 72 patents an hour, four to 
36 an hour, and so on.  Ultimately, however, throwing more bodies at 
the problem is also likely destined to fail. 32   As Dr. Brooks 
demonstrates, adding labor only shortens complicated tasks somewhat 
as additional time will be needed to coordinate the work of the larger 
workforce.33  More significantly, extra labor can result in the overall 
project failing as the complex interactions involved in the project 
become significantly less likely to be detected.34  Although there are 
obvious differences between designing large-scale computer systems 
and reading and understanding massive numbers of patents,35 both seem 
equally technologically complex since neither will succeed in the 
absence of complete information flow.  The point, after all, is not just 
to read patents; 
developing product line, including appreciating how multiple patents 
interface with each other. 
Another way the above estimates may slightly overstate the problem 
is that not all companies are involved in a multitude of industries;36
indeed, some companies, particularly new start-up companies, may be 
involved with a single major project.  Even with that limitation, 
however, if the company is involved with any leading technology, there 
would still be over 5,200 new patents a year to read and absorb on 
average.37  This equates with reading and understanding two and a half 
                                                                                                                                        
LUKE ROMAN & MONICA ROMAN,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHOLOGY, 443 44 (2010). 
32 See FREDERICK P. BROOKS, JR., THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH: ESSAYS ON 
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING plifying outrageously, we state 
Adding manpower to a late software project makes it later.
(emphasis added). Similarly, throwing more patent attorneys at the problem of 
reading and understanding patents could result in a greater amount of work. See id.
at 13 19. 
33 See id.
communication among the subtasks, the effort of communication must be added to 
34 See id. at 18 19, 212. 
35 See id. ny ways, managing a large computer programming 
project is like managing any other large undertaking in more ways than most 
36 But see All Products, GEN. ELEC. CORP., http://www.ge.com/products (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2016) (describing twenty-six product categories); Products for 
Business and Consumers, 3M CORP., http://www.3m.com/3M/en_US/company-us/ 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (describing thirty-two business and seven consumer 
product categories). 
37 The average number of new patents issued in 2014 for the fifty most popular 
art units was 5,257. See Part II, Patent Counts by Class By Year, U.S. PATENT &





patents per business hour, every hour, every day. 38   Further, most 
products are built from technologies that are protected by more than one 
class of patents, which could greatly increase the number of patents that 
must be processed and understood.39
C. The Result: Market-Driven Patent System Fails 
Consequently, it has become a practical impossibility for a company 
to protect itself against infringing patents by a regularized 
marketplace cannot reasonably be expected to know the technology 
disclosed in the 3 million active patents, much less keep track of the 
new disclosures in the 300,000 annually issued new patents. 40
Unfortunately, the patent system continues to operate with this 
expectation.  In In re Seagate Technology, LLC, for example, the 
Federal Circuit noted that willfulness on the part of an accused infringer 
is not needed to establish liability, but it does serve to give the court the 
right to enhance damages that are to be paid for the infringement.41  The 
determination of willfulness is not simple; indeed, the Federal Circuit 
has identified nine factors that are relevant to the determination: 
(1) [W]hether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas 
or design of another; (2) whether the infringer, when he 
knew of the other's patent protection, investigated the 
scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it 
was invalid or that it was not infringed; (3) the infringer's 
behavior as a party to the litigation . . . . (4) [d]efendant's 
size and financial condition . . . (5) [c]loseness of the 
case . . . (6) [d]uration of defendant's misconduct . . . (7) 
[r]emedial action by the defendant . . . (8) [d]efendant's 
                                                                                                                                        
TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm#PartA2 (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2016) [hereinafter USPTO Patent Counts]. If the company were involved 
with the most commonly triggered art class 257: active solid-state devices there 
would have been 15,581 patents to digest. Id.
38 5,200 divided by 2,087. For the most popular art class, 257, approximately 
seven and a half patents would need to be processed every hour. 
39 Consider the television. Its broad art class is 348, the tenth most common
class in 2014. At the same time, seven of the remaining top ten classes could easily 
impact the design of a new TV. Only the seventh and eighth categories, drugs (514) 
and molecular biology (435), are completely separate from television technology. 
Almost 90,000 patents are indexed under the eight TV-relevant classes. See UPSTO 
Patent Counts, supra note 37.  
40 See Crouch, supra note 25; Crouch, USPTO Grants, supra note 26. 
41 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See also 35
U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (authorizing treble damages). 





motivation for harm . . . (9) [w]hether defendant 
attempted to conceal its misconduct.42
Under this test, it is questionable if a defendant can avoid a finding 
of willfulness and its consequential multiple damages if its explanation 
of how the infringement occurred was that searching existing and newly 
issued patents was impractical. 43 Ostrich-like  behavior can be 
evidence of willfulness.44  Consequently, although the explosion in the 
number of potentially relevant patents renders the search task a practical 
impossibility, companies must nevertheless attempt it or could be found 
reckless and thus subject to multiple damages.45  With the number of 
46
that at least one of them will read onto any new product, thereby 
mandating an expensive, but fruitless search for something that is 
unlikely to be found. Alternatively, of course, the current system could 
engage in a futile effort, only to have multiple damages awarded as a 
result. 
The kinds of failure being discussed here are not without precedent 
as another intellectual property system has faced similar issues: 
copyright law.  In a variety of copyright areas, both statutory and 
societal solutions to similar market failures have been developed.47  The 
next section will explore the major solutions that have been applied in 
copyright law.  Following this, some common themes will be extracted 
in order to propose techniques that can help resolve the failures of the 
patent system being discussed in this article. 
                                                                                                                                        
42 Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(citing Read Corp. v. Portec Inc., 970 F.3d 816, 826 27 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).  
43 See id. (imposing an affirmative duty on the infringer to investigate the scope
the infringer 
44 Cf. Metso Minerals, Inc. 
at the defendant 
-like, head-in-the- ,
but nevertheless overturning the district court on its finding of infringement (quoting 
Metso Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen Int'l Distrib. Ltd., 833 F. Supp. 2d 282, 307 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011))). 
45 See In re Seagate
infringement permitting enhanced damages requires at least a showing of objective 
recklessness . . . Accordingly, to establish willful infringement, a patentee must 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively 
high likelihood that its 
46 Id.
47 See infra Part III.A E.





III. COMPULSORY AND SITE LICENSING UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW
The examples from copyright law addresses the use and distribution 
of music and how it addresses performances, particularly those that 
occur through the electronic media.  Primarily, these special copyright 
rules were established either because individualized license 
negotiations to use the expressive work would be impractical 48  or 
because market power between the author and the users of the work was 
significantly out of balance in a way that would prevent the appropriate 
dissemination of the work.49  Copyright law, after all, has to deal with a 
significantly higher number of works than are claimed under the patent 
law.50   In each case, Congress attempted to establish a specialized 
balance for the compensation of authors that differs from that which 
would occur if the market were allowed to operate without special 
rules.51  Examining these rules briefly will provide the background for 
a similar specialized balancing provision for patents. 
A. The Jukebox Provision 17 U.S.C. § 116 
Copyright royalty payments for music played on a jukebox have 
special rules in the Code.52  Under the system in force today, direct 
                                                                                                                                        
48 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
are commercial enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are based on the 
carriage of copyrighted program material and that copyright royalties should be paid 
by cable operators to the creators of such programs. The Committee recognizes, 
however, that it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable 
system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a 
See also Christian Handke, Joint Copyrights Management by 
Collecting Societies and Online Platforms: An Economic Analysis 4 6 (June 9, 
2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2616442. 
49 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 117 
intent of Congress, in enacting the Public Broadcasting Act on November 7, 1967, 
that encouragement and support of noncommercial broadcasting is in the public 
interest. It is also aware that public broadcasting may encounter problems not 
confronted by commercial broadcasting enterprises, due to such factors as the special 
nature of programming, repeated use of programs, and, of course, limited financial 
resources. Thus, the Committee determined that the nature of public broadcasting 
50 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., FISCAL 2013 ANN. REP. 13, available at
http://copyright.gov/reports/annual/2013/ar2013.pdf (showing over 500,000 new 
claims for copyright registrations in each of the last five years). Of course, a 
registration is never sought for a vast majority of copyrighted works because 
registration is not a mandatory prerequisite for copyright validity. See 17 U.S.C. § 
408(a) (2012). 
51 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 50, at 16 17.  
52 See -operated 





negotiation between the jukebox operator and the copyright holder53 is
preferred; but if they do not occur or if they fail, Copyright Royalty 
Judges can set rates for the license pursuant to Chapter 8 of the 
Copyright Act.54
As originally enacted in the 1976 Act, jukeboxes had a more 
particular set of compulsory royalty provisions than the current law 
provides.55  Under the original 1976 provision, an annual royalty was 
set for each jukebox, which was paid to the Copyright Office.56  The 
money that was collected under this provision would then be distributed 
to copyright holders who could prove that their work had been 
performed on a jukebox.57 58
to royalties could be extraordinarily challenging considering that 
jukeboxes are distributed throughout the United States, and are often in 
locations that are not readily available for copyright holders to inspect.59
Despite the practical difficulties, the initially enacted compulsory 
license for jukeboxes was a step forward for music copyright holders, 
as the 1909 Copyright Act provided no compensation for copyright 
holders when a work was performed on a jukebox.60  Indeed, the market 
disturbance that Congress was attempting to correct with the jukebox 
compulsory license provision in the 1976 Copyright Act was the very 
fact that no compensation was being provided to holders of music 
copyrights when the works were played on a jukebox.61  The drafters of 
                                                                                                                                        
Id.  
53 This would include the holder of the copyright in each musical work available 
in the jukebox as well as the holder of the copyright in each performance. 
54 See 17 U.S.C. § 116(b). See generally id. §§ 801 05 (2012) (creating 
Copyright Royalty Judges and establishing the compulsory royalty rate setting 
procedures). The rates established are published at: Compulsory License Fees for 
Coin-Operated Phonorecord Players, 37 C.F.R. § 254.3 (2015). Since the 1990s, a 
privately negotiated set of rates has been in force. Id.  
55 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 116, 90 Stat. 2541, 2564 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2012)). 
56 See 17 U.S.C. § 116(b) (2012). 
57 Costs incurred by the Copyright Office and the Royalty Tribunals were to be 
deducted from the amounts collected. See id. § 116(c)(1)-(4).  
58 Id. § 116(c)(4)(A)-(B). 
59 See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
8.17(B)(7) (2014). 
60 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 76
ion or rendition of a musical composition by or upon coin-operated 
machines shall not be deemed a public performance for profit unless a fee is charged 
repealed 
by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 116, 90 Stat. 2541, 2564 (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2012)). 
61 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 





the 1976 Act determined that the step from requiring no compensation 
by the jukebox industry to requiring normal, fully negotiated copyright 
compensation was too extreme, so a compulsory license was 
appropriate.62  There was also a practical problem of the number of 
negotiations that would be necessary as the jukeboxes of the era could 
each store one-hundred distinct songs.63
B. The Cable Television Provision 17 U.S.C. § 111 
The provisions of section 111 grant compulsory licenses that allow, 
among other similar uses,64 a cable television company to rebroadcast 
over-the-air television signals to its subscribers.65  The basic system 
establishes royalty rates, which are paid by the cable company based on 
its gross receipts from its subscribers.66  Subsequently, any copyright 
                                                                                                                                        
Whatever justification existed for it in 1909 exists no longer, and one class of 
commercial users of music should not be completely absolved from liability when 
jukeboxes were no longer as important in the distribution as they had been through 
the middle of the twentieth century. See TAYLOR COWEN, IN PRAISE OF 
COMMERCIAL CULTURE 164 66 (2000) (noting that three-fourths of the records 
produced in the 1940s were used in jukeboxes); The Jukebox, it Seems, Is a Hit of 
the Past, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 1982),
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/21/garden/the-jukebox-it-seems-is-a-hit-of-the-
past.html (noting a decline in the number of jukeboxes by more than fifty percent 
from the early 1950s to the 1980s). See also KERRY SEGRAVE, JUKEBOXES: AN
AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY 164 66 (2002) (discussing the same). 
62 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 
who have been subject to full copyright liability from the beginning and have made 
the necessary economic and business adjustments over a period of time, the whole 
structure of the jukebox industry has been based on the existence of the copyright 
63 See Seeburg Select-O-Matic Jukebox, VINTAGE VENDING (Aug. 1, 2008), 
http://www.vintagevending.com/seeburg-select-o-matic-jukebox. 
64 This section of the Copyright Act of 1976 is among its most complex 
provisions. See Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) 
ighly detailed compulsory licensing scheme that 
sets out the conditions, including the payment of compulsory fees, under which cable 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 88 
section 111. For the most part, the section is directed at the operation of cable 
television systems . . . [h]owever, other forms of secondary transmissions are also 
considered, including apartment house and hotel systems, wired instructional 
65 See 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (2014). For the current rates, see Adjustment of 
Royalty Fees for Secondary Transmissions by Satellite Carriers, 37 C.F.R. § 
386.2(b) (2015). 
66 See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(1) (2012). Royalty rates are determined based on 





holder who claims to have a work that was rebroadcast must make a 
claim for compensation by filing a claim under the Copyright Royalty 
system set forth in Chapter 8 of the Copyright Act and can be awarded 
a proportionate share of the revenues collected.67  Again, as was the case 
with jukeboxes, if the parties claiming royalties can agree on how the 
money should be distributed, Congress supports that agreement.68
The cable television compulsory royalties system initially was made 
necessary by the failure of the Copyright Act of 1909 to require cable 
systems to provide any compensation for the rebroadcast of the 
signals. 69   After making the determination that cable television 
providers should pay royalties, the lack of such a requirement under the 
1909 Act suggested that transitional provisions, rather than immediately 
using an open market system, would be necessary. 70   Beyond the 
transitional issue, there was congressional doubt that retransmission 
royalties could be adequately addressed by the open market: 
The Committee recognizes . . . that it would be 
impractical and unduly burdensome to require every 
cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner 
whose work was retransmitted by a cable system.  
Accordingly, the Committee has determined . . . to 
establish a compulsory copyright license for the 
retransmission of those over-the-air broadcast signals 
that a cable system is authorized to carry pursuant to the 
rules and regulations of the FCC.71
C. 17 U.S.C. § 
115
Under section 115, a performer is granted a compulsory license for 
making a phonorecord72 of a copyright-protected musical work as long 
                                                                                                                                        
subscribers who are not physically within the range of the normal broadcast signal. 
See id. § 111(d)(1)(B). 
67 See id. § 111(d)(4)(B). 
68 See id. § 111(d)(4)(A). 
69 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89. 
70 See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012). 
71 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89. 
72
in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from 
which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device See also
London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 170 71 (D. Mass. 2008) 
to 





as that work has already been performed on a phonorecord.73  A prior 
phonorecord-captured performance authorized by the copyright holder 
is a prerequisite, and no compulsory license is available for music that 
has not been rendered on a phonorecord with the copyright 
consent.74
Unlike the two compulsory licenses discussed above, this license 
existed under the 1909 Act.75  Congress continued the license after 
determining that it was needed to appropriately balance the market for 
recorded music.76  The modified license found in the 1976 Act clarified 
some aspects of its applicability77 and made it subject to the royalty 
determination provisions in the 1976 Act that allowed for non-
legislative modifications of the rates.78  This continues today under the 
procedures established in Chapter 8 of the Copyright Act. 79   As is 
typical, however, Congress expressly supports private understandings 
about copyright compensation and gives a private agreement preference 
over Chapter 8 defined rates.80
D. The Non-Profit Broadcast Entity 17 U.S.C. § 118 
Public broadcasters are given a compulsory license to use published 
non-dramatic musical, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works in Section 
118 of the Copyright Act.81  Royalties for use are set by Copyright 
                                                                                                                                        
mean a tangible object with a certain heft, like a book or compact disc. Rather, it 
73 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 94-
[Section 115], . . . a musical composition that has been reproduced in phonorecords 
with the permission of the copyright owner may generally be reproduced in 
phonorecords by another person, if that person notifies the copyright owner and pays 
for Making and Distributing Phonorecords. 37 C.F.R. § 385.3(a) (2015). 
74 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2012). 
75 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075
76 (repealed 1976). 
76 Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 107 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 83, 90th Cong., at 
66 67 (1967), which discussed the dispute between maintaining the license to
special antitrust problems existing in 1909" no longer existed). 
77 See id. at 107 08.
78 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(C) (2012). 
79 See id.
80 See id. § 115(c)(3)(B). The reality today is that compulsory license royalty 
rates serve as a cap as most music performances that cover prior works are 
negotiated. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 59, § 8.04(I). 
81 See 17 U.S.C. § 118(c) (2012). Currently defined rates can be found at: Use of 
Certain Copyrighted Works in Connection with Noncommercial Educational 
Broadcasting, 37 C.F.R. § 381 (2015). 





Royalty Judges under Chapter 8.82
This license is the one that is most directly designed to satisfy a need 
for the distribution of copyrighted works because it is in the public 
interest even though market economics may prevent this from 
happening: 
The Committee is cognizant of the intent of Congress, in 
enacting the Public Broadcasting Act on November 7, 
1967, that encouragement and support of 
noncommercial broadcasting is in the public interest.  It 
is also aware that public broadcasting may encounter 
problems not confronted by commercial broadcasting 
enterprises, due to such factors as the special nature of 
programming, repeated use of programs, and, of course, 
limited financial resources.  Thus, the Committee 
determined that the nature of public broadcasting does 
warrant special treatment in certain areas.83
  
                                                                                                                                        
82 See 17 U.S.C. § 118(b)(4) (2012). In the typical arrangement, a private 
agreement will be enforced over the rates set by the Royalty Judges. See id. §
118(b)(4); id. § 118(c). 






E. Performing Rights Organizations Collective Site Licenses 
Performing Rights Organizations such as ASCAP 84  and BMI 85
allow musicians to collect royalties where it would otherwise be 
difficult or impossible.86  Equally, the organizations allow facilities 
such as concert halls to lessen the likelihood that performance of a
copyrighted work at the facility will be infringing because the catalog 
of works held by the organizations is quite broad.87  Each organization 
negotiates a license agreement with entities that commonly use multiple 
copyrighted works, such as night clubs, concert halls, radio and 
television broadcasters, etc.88 By entering into the license agreement, 
the entity is given a site license to use all compositions within the 
ASCAP or BMI catalog of music.89  For example, if a musical group 
performs a copyrighted song in a performance at a concert hall, the hall 
itself will not be considered an infringer, as it will have a license for the 
performance; otherwise, the hall could have copyright liability 
regardless of the responsibilities of the musicians.90  The compensation 
that is paid to the Performing Rights Organization is distributed to the 
                                                                                                                                        
84 See What is ASCAP?, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2016
(ASCAP) [is] a membership association of more than 525,000 US composers, 
songwriters, lyricists and music publishers of every kind of music . . . . We protect 
the rights of ASCAP members by licensing and distributing royalties for the non-
85 See generally Our Role, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/about (last visited Mar. 7,
2016 and organizations that play music publicly by 
offering blanket music licenses that permit them to play more than 10.5 million 
86 Cf., e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. McDade & Sons, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 
1124 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
87 See id.
88 See ASCAP Music License Agreements and Reporting Forms, ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/licensing/licensefinder (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (listing the 
different types of entities for which a license is available); Music Users: Apply for 
your BMI Music License, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/licensing (last visited Mar. 7,
2016) (listing some types of entities and allowing for the search for others). 
89 See ASCAP Licensing: Frequently Asked Questions: What does the ASCAP 
license do?, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/licensing/licensingfaq.aspx#general 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016); Licensing FAQ: What does a business really get with a 
BMI Music License?, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/licensing (last visited Mar. 7,
2016). 
90 See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Niro's Palace, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 958, 961 
copying is the public performance of another's musical composition. Moreover, not 
only is the performer liable for infringement, but so is anyone who sponsors the 





actual copyright holders by the organization.91
IV. THE UNIFYING CONCEPTS BEHIND THE COPYRIGHT 
COMPULSORY AND PERFORMING RIGHTS LICENSES AND THE 
MATCHING THEMES IN MODERN PATENT PRACTICE THAT JUSTIFY 
DEVELOPING SIMILAR MANDATORY PATENT LICENSES
When the licensing methodologies discussed in part III above are 
analyzed, several common concepts emerge, most of which are 
applicable to solving issues arising in modern patent use.  These themes 
segment into four major areas: (1) open market negotiations not being a 
realistic expectation; (2) enforcement against infringement being at best 
problematic, or at worst impossible; (3) an holder
intellectual property rights is overly self-centered, imposing costs that 
; 
and (4) a need to protect a newly created market for a developing kind 
of work.  Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
A. Expecting the Parties to Engage in an Open Market Negotiation 
is not Realistic 
The most common theme that interconnects the five copyright 
compulsory or collective site licenses is that a face-to-face negotiation 
for the rights to use a particular kind of copyrighted work is often not 
practical.  For jukeboxes, it would be impractical to expect the operator 
of each box to discuss royalty payments with every artist represented on 
a record within the box as over 100,000 songs can now be found on a 
modern jukebox.92  A similar, but more complex problem is raised by a 
, as each show could 
involve independently owned and controlled copyrights in the dramatic 
script and its performance as well as the music and other copyrighted 
works that are incorporated.93  For both record covers and nonprofit 
                                                                                                                                        
91 See ASCAP Payment System: Introduction, ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/members/payment/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016); How We Pay 
Royalties: General Royalty Information, BMI,
http://www.bmi.com/creators/royalty/general_information (last visited Mar. 7,
2016). 
92 See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012). See also Rock-Ola Bubbler Nostalgic Music 
Center, BMI GAMING.COM, http://www.bmigaming.com/games-jukebox-digital.htm 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (describing ability of digital jukebox to hold 125,000 
songs). As a result, multiple negotiations might be needed for each song because 
both the rights of the music copyright and performance copyright can be affected. 
93 See Fara Daun, Comment, The Content Shop: Toward an Economic Legal
Structure for Clearing and Licensing Multimedia Content, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
215, 215 18 (1996) (discussing the copyright issues raised by multimedia). See also





uses, the negotiation difficulty is a result of inherent market imbalances 
as neither a typical singer nor a public broadcasting system can obtain 
the copyright clearances needed to function because of their limited 
financial means.94  Finally, for performance venues, negotiating for 
permission for each song that is going to be performed would be
impractical; after all, the venue may not even know in advance what 
songs are going to be performed by a performer.95
The inability to negotiate is typical in the modern patent system as 
well.  As discussed in Part II above, patent enforcement is no longer
based on the reading on process that theoretically underlies the system 
as doing so is no longer practical.96  Whether the root cause of this 
transformation is based on the overwhelming quantity of patents being 
se their patent portfolios in 
ways not designed by the law does not matter, as the reality is that open 
market negotiations for most patents is an unrealistic expectation.97
B. Enforcing Against Infringement is Problematic 
A second common theme that ties copyright licenses together is that 
practical enforcement of rights is often difficult to impossible.  For 
example, the holder of the rights to a song or its performance may find 
it close to impossible to know if those rights are infringed by a jukebox 
located in a private club, or by a concert given in a church recreation 
hall.98  First, few copyright holders have the resources to survey all of 
the possible infringers around the country. 99  Even if the copyright 
                                                                                                                                        
Stacey M. Byrnes, Copyright Licenses, New Technology and Default Rules: 
Converging Media, Diverging Courts?, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 243, 244 46 
(2000) (discussing difficulty of determining whether a new use is authorized under 
an earlier license). 
94 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 117 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5732 (noting financial limitations on public broadcasting). See also Daun, 
supra note 93, at 232 (discussing covers). 
95 See Daun, supra note 93, at 262 (discussing blanket licenses). 
96 See generally Brad Plumer, Software Patents are Impractical




97 As is discussed in more depth below, pioneering patents that develop a new 
technology require separate consideration. 
98 ASCAP Payment System: Keeping Track of Performances, ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/members/payment/keepingtrack.aspx (last visited Mar. 7,
2016). 
99 Id. (explaining the difficulty in determining copyright use); ASCAP Payment 
System: The ASCAP Surveys, ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/members/payment/surveys.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) 





holder could locate every jukebox that contains a phonorecord of a 
copyrighted song or performance, infringement does not occur until the 
phonorecord is played,100 which could be at any hour of the day or night.  
Mere possession of a legitimate phonorecord does not constitute 
infringement.101  Similarly, a concert in a church hall may only be open 
to members of the church and never be advertised to the public, yet it 
remains an infringing public performance  under the Copyright Act.102
The use of mandatory royalties and collective societies cannot eliminate 
these problems of enforcement, particularly by smaller entities, but can 
significantly limit the problem among more commercial users of 
copyrighted music. 
In many patent-intensive industries, similar enforcement problems 
occur.  For software- or business method-based inventions, in particular, 
it can be difficult or impossible to know whether a competitor is using 
a claimed invention, as it is likely to be incorporated into a complex 
software system or hidden in the back-office business processing of a 
company.103  For software, although it is theoretically possible to reverse 
engineer a computer program to determine how it is designed and 
whether it practices a patented invention, the reality is often different.  
In the best of circumstances, reverse-engineering software is 
technologically challenging, 104  but even if it should prove possible, 
many products are distributed using purported licensing agreements that 
                                                                                                                                        
(noting the same). 
100 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012) (explaining that infringement occurs when any 
exclusive rights of the copyright holder, provided in section 106, are violated); 17
U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012) (listing the right to play a phonorecord as an exclusive right 
of the copyright holder).   
101 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012) (listing the reproduction of a phonorecord as 
copyright infringement). See also 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (listing the public performance 
of a phonorecord as copyright infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1)(A) (2012) 
(authorizing seizure and destruction of an unauthorized phonorecord; Jalbert v. 
Grautski, 554 F. Supp. 2d 57, 68 (D. Mass. 2008) (explaining that it is the 
t constitutes copyright 
infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012)).  
102 A performance is considered public under the Copyright Act when it is
. . . at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial 
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances is gathered  (emphasis added). As a non-
human, churches have no family or social acquaintances. Cf. Columbia Pictures Ind., 
Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
103 See Business Method Patents, IPWATCHDOG,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/patent/business-method-patents/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2016). 
104 See Mathew Schwartz, Reverse-Engineering, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 12, 
2001, 12:00 AM PT), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2585652/app-
development/reverse-engineering.html. 





prohibit reverse-engineering from being attempted, 105  making an 
attempt to discover potential infringement a breach of contract.  For 
business-based patents, the problem can be even more intractable.  
Some business patents are practiced in front of the customer, potentially 
allowing the technology to be observed for example, one can see how 
French fries are prepared at most fast food restaurants but others are 
completely hidden one cannot see how a brokerage determines proxy 
voting rights for shares held in a street name without access to the 
. 
C. Avoiding Excessively Selfish Assertions of an Intellectual 
Property Right is Required 
With some uses of copyrighted music, requiring a one-on-one 
negotiation for the use of the work will lead to circumstances that can 
be best described as a failure of intellectual property law to achieve its 
primary goal: the wide dissemination of the copyrighted work.106  For 
example, the holder of a copyrighted musical composition may wish to 
prevent anyone save himself or herself to sing a copyrighted song in a 
public performance.  Theoretically, insisting on this methodology could 
maximize the financial return to the holder, particularly if the 
composition is popular.  If the public wants to hear a performance of the 
song, the copyright holder gains compensation for both the music and 
the performance rather than just the music alone.107  This model of 
distribution, however, discounts the reality of how music tends to 
spread.  After all, if people hear a new song that strikes their fancy, they
s 108 with the 
corresponding demand for more performances than the copyright holder 
can satisfy.  The cover license provision in the Copyright Act works 
against this consequence by giving, in effect, the copyright holder only 
the first opportunity of releasing the song on a phonorecord but, having 
                                                                                                                                        
105 See David N. Pruitt, Beyond Fair Use: The Right to Contract Around 
Copyright Protection of Reverse Engineering in the Software Industry, 6 CHI.-KENT 
J. INTELL. PROP. 66 (2006). It may be that such a contractual attempt to prevent 
reverse-engineering by all customers constitutes an inappropriate use of state law in 
a way that is preempted by federal intellectual property policy. See Ralph D. 
Clifford, The Federal Circuit's Cruise to Uncharted Waters: How Patent Protection 
for Algorithms and Business Methods May Sink the UCITA and State Intellectual 
Property Protection, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1241, 1269 (2000). 
106 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1.03[A] (Matthew Bender ed., 2007). 
107 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)-(d) (2012). 
108 PETER SCHICKELE, , on AN HYSTERIC RETURN P.D.Q.
BACH AT CARNEGIE HALL (Vanguard Records 1966). 





done so, all others may also, paying the copyright holder what is 
determined to be a fair royalty for the privilege of using the underlying 
music.109
In the world of patents, this overly selfish assertion of rights is also 
seen.  As a primary example, a patent holder can exercise a patent to 
prevent all others from making, using or selling the patented invention 
even though the holder is not planning on using the invention.110  In 
effect, the patent holder is using the patent to injure others by preventing 
their use of the invention for no return.111
The early days of the electronics industry serve as an example of 
how the strong assertion of patent rights can have a significantly 
negative effect on the development of a technology.  John Fleming, the 
first individual to obtain a patent in what became the electronics space, 
was granted a patent on the vacuum-tube diode.112  Less than two years 
later, Lee de Forest was issued a patent on the vacuum-tube triode.113
Although the triode has functions that are quite different than the 
diode fundamentally, a diode transforms electricity from alternating 
to direct form while a triode can amplify signals114 a triode can also 
be used as a diode and, more critically, a triode reads on to the Fleming 
diode patent.115  Unfortunately, both Fleming and de Forest strongly 
asserted their patents, resulting in a significant delay in the development 
of electronic technology as no one could safely license the technology 
from either of the parties.116
Today, the use of a patent to prevent anyone from using a 
                                                                                                                                        
109 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2012). 
110 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012). 
111 See id. 
112 U.S. Patent No. 803,684 (filed Apr. 19, 1905). 
113 U.S. Patent No. 841,387 (filed Oct. 25, 1906). 
114 See Early Tube History, ALL ABOUT CIRCUITS,
http://www.allaboutcircuits.com/textbook/semiconductors/chpt-13/early-tube-
history/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (describing the diode); The Triode, ALL ABOUT 
CIRCUITS, http://www.allaboutcircuits.com/textbook/semiconductors/chpt-13/the-
triode/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) (describing the triode); see also Radio Corp. of 
s., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 10 11 (1934) (discussing the use of 
both devices for capturing and producing radio waves). 
115 See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co., 
243 F. 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1917). See also Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement 
Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 688 (2014) (discussing how an earlier 
116 See Peter E. Mayeux, Fleming, Sir John Ambrose 1849 1945 British 
Electrical Engineer; Inventor of the Vacuum Tube, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RADIO 972
(Christopher H. Sterling ed., 





- 117  What is being identified 
in this article, however, is narrower than a NPE; instead, a distinction is 
being made between a NPE that actively seeks to allow others to use a 
patented invention by entering into license agreements118 and one that 
seeks to prevent a technology from being used although no attempts are 
made to market the technology.  Where patent rights are used solely to 
the third theme underlying copyright compulsory licenses.119
D. Protecting a Newly Emerging Market 
The final common theme that underlies these copyright licenses is
the need to respond to a newly developing market.  Sometimes this new 
market for copyrighted works was a result of the prior law leaving the 
use free from copyright restrictions. 120   Other times, the market 
developed because of a novel technology.121  In both cases, Congress 
determined that an open, one-on-one negotiation between the copyright 
holders and the new users would be ruinous to the development of the 
newly emerging distribution method.122
The primary example of a market being protected is the jukebox 
provision in the 1976 Copyright Act.123  The 1909 Act left the use of 
music by a jukebox completely free from copyright limitations. 124
Congress felt that the transition from not having to pay any 
compensation to having to negotiate a royalty provision for each song 
was likely to cause the extinction of the jukebox industry.125
A good example of the second type of market-protection need is 
shown by the cable television provisions. 126   This industry was 
developing at the time the 1976 Act was being crafted.127  Congress was 
fearful that the parties controlling copyrighted works on the existing 
broadcast media would be likely to prevent the use of their copyrights 
                                                                                                                                        
117 See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the 
, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 437 41 (2014). 
118 For example, most universities would fit into this category. See Mark A. 
Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 611 (2008). 
119 See infra Part IV.D. 
120 See supra Part III.A. 
121 See supra Part III.B. 
122 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5728. 
123 See 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2012); supra Part III-A.  
124 See supra note 60. 
125 See id.
126 See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012); supra Part III-B  
127 See supra Part III-B.





by the cable industry as a way of preventing the cable industry itself 
from growing.128
Unlike the first three common themes that unify the copyright 
mandatory license provisions, patent law differs somewhat 
dramatically.  It is an acceptable motive, as a general matter, for the 
holder of a patent to use it to prevent a competitor from entering a 
marketplace.129  The basic legal right given by each system explains this 
difference.  A copyright holder has the affirmative right to use the 
copyrighted work;130 a patent holder does not, and can only prevent 
others from using the invention.131  More fundamentally, however, is 
the purpose of the patent system the development of new technology, 
broadly defined.132  As the law of patents is specifically designed to 
regulate the entry of new technologies into society, the overall system 
is not affected adversely by new inventions in the way the copyright 
system often is.133
V. APPLYING COMPULSORY LICENSING TO PATENTS
A. Why Patent Licenses Are Needed 
The current patent system does not, in general, use compulsory 
licenses, and patent holders outside of a few narrow areas134 or where 
                                                                                                                                        
128 See supra Part III-B.
129 See generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of 
Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN L. REV. 101, 119 20 (2006) (describing the 
increased costs of market entry caused by the existence of invalid patents). 
130 See 17 U.S.
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize ) (emphasis 
added).
131 See . . . grant to the 
patentee . . . the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale, or selling 
) (emphasis added). 
132 See U.S. CONST. ss of Science . . . 
133 New technologies that can preserve artistic expressions have historically 
been responsible for causing then existing copyright provisions to become non-
functional. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68
OR. L. REV. 275, 276 77, 281 82 (1989). For example, piano rolls, an early form of 
recorded music, were not within the scope of protection found in the Copyright Act 
when they were first developed, leaving that version of a musical expression without 
copyright protection for decades. See White-Smith Music Pub  Co. v. Apollo Co., 
209 U.S. 1, 13 (1908). 
134 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012) (allowing the attorney 
license the patent if such licensing is necessary to comply with certain aspects of the 





required as a remedy135 can choose when and if to authorize others to 
use their patented technology.136  As discussed above, however, the 
current way in which businesses are using patents introduces significant 
problems, and results in the redefinition of the underlying principle of 
the patent system of rewarding disclosure with the ability to monopolize 
the technology.137  Numerous articles have been written that attempt to 
address some of these problems.138  It may be time to acknowledge, 
however, that the actors who operate the patent system, as well as those 
who gain its benefits, have insufficient motivation to do anything but 
preserve the status quo. 139   Consequently, in order to restore its 
operating principles, alternative mechanisms need to be explored to 
redirect The basic thesis 
expressed here is that mandatory licenses patterned after the ones used 
in the copyright system would serve to re-equilibrate the system and, in 
particular, would resolve the two primary problems that were identified 
clubs;
1. Haystack Clubs 
Using a patent portfolio, rather than individual patents, as a 
                                                                                                                                        
compliance); Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2012) (granting similar 
authority to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 
135 See United States v. Glaxo Grp., Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 58 59 (1973) 
-royalty licensing 
[are] well-
136 See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981
a patent holder, however, merely exercises his right to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling the invention by refusing unilaterally to license his patent for its 
seventeen-year term, such conduct is expressly permitted by the patent laws
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 
195 F.3d 1346, 1362 63 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
137 See supra part II.A. 
138 See, e.g., Maayan Perel, From Non-Practicing Entities (NPES) to Non-
Practiced Patents (NPPS): A Proposal for A Patent Working Requirement, 83 U.
CIN. L. REV. 747 (2015); Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 461 (2014); David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-
Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014); Mark A. 
Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 2117 (2013).
139 See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. n this drumbeat for 
improved patent quality is that the modern patent system affirmatively encourages 
low patent quality the incentives at work are such that we cannot reasonably expect 
anything other than very large numbers of low-  (footnote omitted)). 





litigation club presents the same kind of system failure as that which 
justified the special copyright rules for jukeboxes and cable television.  
For both of these copyright systems, individual negotiations would be 
impractical because there are too many rights holders involved and the 
odds are too great that a mistake regarding coverage will result in 
liability. 140   Consequently, automatic negotiations in the form of a 
statutory license are used.141
Allowing the use of a haystack of patents causes a similar failure.  
Just as an operator of a jukebox or cable system cannot realistically deal 
with thousands of individual rights negotiations to be allowed to engage 
in its everyday operation, a company cannot do so when faced with 
hundreds or thousands of patents.142  Without a viable mechanism to 
dete
the company is left with no harbor to avoid potential infringement.143
Like the copyrighted music in a jukebox or television shows being 
rebroadcast by a cable system, the reality is that individual patent-by-
patent analysis for the ones in a haystack portfolio is impossible. 
2. Disabling Numerosity 
While the haystack club is a tactical business approach that has been 
adopted to maximize the economic return from a patent portfolio
often beyond the legally justifiable return from the individual patents 
contained within it numerosity is a problem inherent in the current 
patent system.144  With 300,000 newly issued patents each year on top 
of the base of 3 million active patents, it has become impossible to 
absorb newly disclosed technology, particularly within the most 
innovative fields.145  The most similar copyright problem is the public 
performance of music as there are millions of public performances of 
copyrighted music on an annual basis. 146   The primary copyright 
                                                                                                                                        
140 See Brent Skorup, What Market Failure? The Weak Transaction Cost 
Argument for TV Compulsory Licenses, THE TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT (July 
31, 2015), https://techliberation.com/2015/07/31/what-market-failure-the-weak-
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141 See id. 
142 Stefan Wagner, , YALE 
INSIGHTS (Apr. 22, 2015), http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/are-patent-thickets-
smothering-innovation/. 
143 See Steven Levy, The Patent Problem, WIRED (Nov. 13, 2012, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2012/11/ff-steven-levy-the-patent-problem/. 
144 Id.
145 See Crouch, supra note 25; Crouch, USPTO Grants, supra note 26. 
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response to this is the recognition of the performing rights societies.147
These groups allow one negotiation to occur which results in the 
authorized use of large catalogs of protected works.148  The user of 
copyrighted music can be assured that the use of any of the multitude of 
works within the catalog will be authorized, including new works 
developed after the original negotiation with the performing rights 
society was concluded.149
For patents, no system is available to acquire rights to use a patent 
by entering into a collective licensing agreement with multiple patent 
holders.  Although this absence does not affect the licensing of all 
patents a patent that pioneers a new field is particularly appropriate 
for one-on-one licensing for a vast majority of them, it creates a 
significant impediment.150  Specifically, the market value associated 
with the license of a patent that claims a minor advancement151 in a 
technological area should be correspondingly small.  In reality, 
however, the value that can be claimed is greatly enlarged because of 
the costs associated with litigating patent rights.152
B. How Mandatory Patent Licenses Would Work 
1. Establishing Field Licenses 
To implement the proposed system, there would need to be two 
classifications for patents. Most patents likely the ones that add a 
minimal amount to the known technology would be subject to the 
                                                                                                                                        
defined broadly to include personal or transmitted performances to groups other than 
nd friends. Id. Consequently, public performances are quite common 
performance. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2507 10 
(2014); Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 278 79 (4th 
Cir. 1989); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 158
59 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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149 See id. See also Using Copyrighted Music, ASCAP,
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152 See supra note 17. For an invalid patent, any licensing fee is presumably 
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mandatory licensing system. This type of patent will be referred to as a 
-  The others that do, in fact, more significantly 
advance knowledge, could be excluded from the mandatory licensing 
system, thereby requiring an individually negotiated license.  These will 
-
The determination of which license class a patent is placed would
be made by the holder of the patent rights.  For the system to be 
effective, the decision to choose the individually-licensed class would 
have to be at a high enough cost that an holder would be incentivized to 
choose an individually-licensed patent only where significant returns 
should be expected because of its pioneering nature. 
a. Determining Field-License Royalties 
For the field-licensed patents, a neutral magistrate153 would define 
a royalty rate for all patents within a particular field of technology.  
Once the rate for the field is established, a company could buy a license 
to use all of the patents within a particular field.  In other words, the 
154 a product that practices anything claimed by a patent within 
the field upon payment of the required license fee.  The fees collected 
for these licenses would be distributed to all who own a field-licensed 
patent within the relevant field.  As a result, the inventor receives 
compensation for the use of the invention potentially more than would 
have been received without this proposed licensing system 
functioning155
rewarding inventors for disclosing their inventions 156  while giving 
product developers an effective safe harbor against a multitude of patent 
claims, whether by patent trolls or by more legitimate companies. 
It is important to note that no attempt need be made to determine 
that a particular product reads on to a particular patent within the field 
or even, for that matter, whether a patent was improperly granted.  If the 
product practices an art within the field, the mandatory license would 
                                                                                                                                        
153 This would presumably be an administrative judge operating a system of 
adjudication similar to that established in the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801
05 (2012). 
154 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
155 In fact, most inventors are likely to receive more compensation under this
system than they do now as most patents fail to achieve any financial remuneration. 
See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPS. 75, 
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apply and the compensation paid for the field-license would make the 
use of any field-licensed patent non-infringing. 
for the purpose of mandatory licensing.  The easiest approach would be 
, which 
technological field.157  For some of these classes, however, the Code 
covers an immense amount of technology that differs more than the 
single class implies. 158   Consequently, if considering the most 
commonly patented technologies, the sub-classes defined by the patent 
office may be more appropriate.159  In contrast to this, of course, are the 
least popular Patent and Trademark O  classes where 
subdividing beyond the primary class definition would seem to be a 
colossally over defined.160  Consequently, it may be more appropriate 
to give regulatory authority to the Patent Office to define and potentially 
 This would 
allow the system to be responsive to the different sizes of each patent 
class as well as their relative popularity, and would allow the PTO to 
keep the system responsive as technology changes.  
b. Electing Out of Field-Licensing 
Although field-licensing would work better than the current system 
for most patents, an exception would be necessary for certain types of 
patents.  When an inventor creates something in a broad field of 
technology a pioneering invention field-license compensation 
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Harness for Working Animal has far fewer subclasses and accounts for few modern 
patent applications). 
159 See USPTO Classifications, supra note 157. 
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would be an insufficient reward.  The patent system has long recognized 
that the quantity of the reward provided needs to be dependent on the 
scope of the invention, giving a greater reward to the inventor of a more 
significant invention.161  Consequently, some way is needed to exempt 
a patent from the field-licensing system.  Two basic methods are 
possible: an attempt can be made to globally define what constitutes a 
pioneering invention so that this occurs automatically or, alternatively, 
the inventor could be allowed to decide for him or herself that the 
invention is a major transformation of existing technology.  
The first approach is likely to be extraordinarily difficult to achieve, 
as the breadth of technology that is subject to patent is effectively 
illimitable, including technological fields that have yet to be 
conceived.162  It would indeed be hard, if not impossible, to define what 
a pioneering invention is, since this can often only be determined in 
hindsight. 163   Additionally, any definitional approach is likely to 
introduce significant uncertainty about whether the field-license applies 
to a particular patent, thus removing one of the principle justifications 
for creating them.164
If the alternate approach of self-definition is taken, the decision to 
exclude a patent from the field-licensing system cannot be without cost 
to the inventor. After all, if all inventors elect out of the system, the 
patent system returns to the status quo and will not gain the benefits 
obtained by field-licensing.  Consequently, the inventor must pay a cost 
to elect out of field-licensing that is expensive enough that the inventor 
is expressing a high degree of confidence that more compensation will 
be obtained from individually negotiated license fees than would be 
earned from field-license royalties. The opt-out system would take 
                                                                                                                                        
161 See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923) 
real merit of the alleged discovery or invention is, and whether it has advanced the 
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only a slight step forward, and that which he says is a discovery is on the border line 
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162 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting that 
163 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. A good example demonstrating 
this can be found in the early days of electronics. Although Fleming is credited with 
inventing the vacuum tube diode having starting his work in 1895, there is strong 
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obtaining potentially higher compensation against the surety of 
obtaining compensation at a lower level. 
Of the two approaches, therefore, the second seems more likely to 
be effective. Development of a predictive algorithm that could reliably 
determine which inventions are pioneering is extraordinarily unlikely.  
Just as defining obscenity is problematic,165 determining when a patent 
is pioneering is likely to require its effect in the marketplace to be 
measured. On the other hand, if it is assumed that inventors as a class 
are likely to be rational market actors, their collective decisions about 
whether to treat their patents as pioneering will be a relatively 
reasonable predictor of that fact. 
The second approach is dependent on establishing an appropriate 
opt-out fee. The fee forces each inventor to engage in a cost-benefit 
analysis with respect to each patent. If the patent remains part of the 
field-licensing system, its royalty return will be limited by the modest 
rate that is likely to be defined for each field and by the number of 
patents that claim inventions within the field.166  On the other hand, a 
field-licensed patent holder is effectively guaranteed a royalty return of 
some amount unless the field itself is not of interest to any operating 
company.167  Similarly, the cost of enforcing patent rights should be 
significantly less than the current system as it should be in the economic 
interest of most developers of technology to obtain field-licenses in the 
fields in which their operations lie. 
2. Determining Royalty Rates for Field-Licenses 
The hardest aspect of implementing the proposal for field-licenses 
would likely be the establishment of an appropriate rate to be paid for 
each license. The payment must serve as sufficient compensation to the 
group of inventors with a patent in the field so that advancements to the 
specific technology represented within the field are properly 
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incentivized, while costing an amount that will encourage others to 
obtain a field-license rather than using the technology in the hopes of 
not being sued. 
To begin the analysis, it is necessary to carefully articulate exactly 
what would be acquired if a field-license were to be purchased. A field-
license is, effectively, a license similar to the site licenses used by the 
copyright performing rights organizations.168  By having one, its holder 
would have the right to practice any invention that has a claim within a 
particular field, unless the patent has been properly excluded from the 
field-licensing system.169  The practice could be a one-time occurrence
to overcome the limitations of the experimental use defense,170 for 
example or could be used to distribute millions of products that 
practice a covered claim.  In each case, the field-license royalty would 
be the compensation to which the patent holder is entitled. 
As the rate is set, therefore, the typical economic importance of a 
non-pioneering patent needs to be determined.  Several factors are 
important to this analysis; some favor a high royalty rate, while others 
suggest otherwise.  Ultimately, administrative judges would need to 
balance: 
Rewarding Inventors: The first and broadest factor favors 
establishing a high rate for a field-license. The underlying purpose of 
the patent system is to reward inventors for disclosing inventions.171
The holders of a patent have a monopoly granted by the PTO based on 
its determination that the statutory requisites have been met. 172
Consequently, as the patentees have disclosed a technology that was not 
yet within the prior art, it is important to ensure that the reward provided 
is significant enough to serve as a motivation for future inventors to 
continue both inventing and disclosing new technology.173
Encouraging More Innovation: The second factor also favors 
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169 See supra Part V.B.1. 
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setting higher rates.  It recognizes that although most new inventions do 
not move technology forward in a significant manner, they do represent 
an economically valuable improvement to the technology.  A good 
example of this is the intermittent wiper on automobiles.174  That feature 
is not needed to operate an automobile, not even when it is raining. At
the same time, it created a better way of responding to a light rain in an 
automobile as is demonstrated by its universal adoption. Further, it was 
shown to have considerable economic value before it expired. 175
Royalty rates for field-licenses, therefore, need to be responsive to the 
likely economic value of a patent within the field. 
Field of Innovation: The third factor the specific technology 
included within the field could affect the compensation in either 
direction.  Whatever rates are established need to be sensitive to the 
differing economic value that an invention has based on the technology 
being developed.  A new design for a horse-and-buggy could certainly 
qualify for a patent, for example; but it is unlikely to be of any 
significant value in modern society.  On the other hand, a new 
telecommunication invention like Bluetooth176 could be of significant 
economic value.  Consequently, the rates would need to be set by each 
field rather than globally.177
Low Value of Most Patents: Not all factors favor setting a high rate.  
In reality, the open-market economic value of many if not most
patents is negligible.178  For the non-exceptional patent, the holder never 
collects any royalties.179  This fact serves to suggest that a low rate of 
field-license royalty would be appropriate and serves to contradict the 
other factors that favor higher rates.180  As a consequence of this, rate 
setting within a field would need to be sensitive to the number of patents 
currently issued in the field and the proportion of them that fail to 
achieve any return. 
Age of the Patent: The current patent term is twenty years from the 
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application date. 181   For many technologies, however, a patented 
invention is not equally valuable throughout its duration. 182   Some 
technologies, such as data processing equipment, can become obsolete 
quickly. 183   For these types of patents, a higher rate would be 
value thereafter.  For other technologies, often legacy technologies that 
are no longer at the leading edge of development,184 lowering the value 
with the passage of time would be less appropriate. 
Projected Use by the Licensee: The final distinction that the system
should consider is one based on how the licensee is expecting to use the 
patents.  At one extreme, where a licensee wishes to experiment within 
a technological area, either to develop new products or for any reason 
that is just more than idle curiosity,185 but does not intend to widely 
practice any patent within the field, a lower fee would seem appropriate.  
If, however, patents within the field are likely to be practiced 
constantly through the distribution of products that likely practice one 
or more of the patents in the field, for example a broader and 
consequently more expensive license for the technology would be 
appropriate.186
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Patent law is designed to encourage the transfer of technology from 
being solely within the knowledge of an inventor to being part of the 
common knowledge of society.187  The main methods by which this is 
achieved is by publishing patents with their specifications and by 
incentivizing patentees to use or license their inventions.188  For the 
information contained within patents to spread, the information has to 
be readily ascertainable by those interested in it.189  The reality of the 
modern system, however, fails to achieve this goal because of the 
overwhelming number of patents being issued, many of which are of 
questionable quality. 
The mandatory licensing scheme proposed in this paper is designed 
to overcome the failure of the current patent system to achieve its 
underlying justification.  Rather than using patents in ways that prevent 
technology from being transferred, it will ease the flow of technology 
from inventors to the public.  
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